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Optimizing Authenticated Garbling for Faster Secure Two-Party Computation

  • Jonathan Katz
  • Samuel Ranellucci
  • Mike Rosulek
  • Xiao Wang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10993)

Abstract

Wang et al. (CCS 2017) recently proposed a protocol for malicious secure two-party computation that represents the state-of-the-art with regard to concrete efficiency in both the single-execution and amortized settings, with or without preprocessing. We show here several optimizations of their protocol that result in a significant improvement in the overall communication and running time. Specifically:
  • We show how to make the “authenticated garbling” at the heart of their protocol compatible with the half-gate optimization of Zahur et al. (Eurocrypt 2015). We also show how to avoid sending an information-theoretic MAC for each garbled row. These two optimizations give up to a 2.6\(\times \) improvement in communication, and make the communication of the online phase essentially equivalent to that of state-of-the-art semi-honest secure computation.

  • We show various optimizations to their protocol for generating AND triples that, overall, result in a 1.5\(\times \) improvement in the communication and a 2\(\times \) improvement in the computation for that step.

Notes

Acknowledgments

This material is based on work supported by NSF awards #1111599, #1563722, #1564088, and #1617197. Portions of this work were also supported by DARPA and SPAWAR under contract N66001-15-C-4065. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes not withstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views, opinions, and/or findings expressed are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jonathan Katz
    • 1
  • Samuel Ranellucci
    • 1
    • 2
  • Mike Rosulek
    • 3
  • Xiao Wang
    • 1
  1. 1.University of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.George Mason UniversityFairfaxUSA
  3. 3.Oregon State UniversityCorvallisUSA

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