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Board, Firm Value, and Corporate Policies

  • Ettore Croci
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter reviews board characteristics such as size, composition, leadership, staggered boards, busyness, and diversity. Advances in the literature have brought clarity, but not one-size-fits-all answers. While smaller boards on average increase firm value, there is not an optimal size for all firms. Independence leads to more board oversight and usually increases value, but insiders can also be helpful. Separating chief executive officer and chairman is often beneficial, but some firms benefit from combining the roles. Staggered boards do not seem to destroy value. Researchers have investigated diversity, especially gender diversity. Generally, greater heterogeneity may not necessarily improve board efficacy. Bank boards are also examined. Bank s have larger boards, and more independence may be detrimental if the alignment with the shareholders leads to more risk-taking.

Keywords

Board size Independence CEO duality Staggered board Busyness Diversity Bank 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ettore Croci
    • 1
  1. 1.Università Cattolica del Sacro CuoreMilanoItaly

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