Human Resources and Incentive Contracts

  • Andrew Seltzer
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Economic History book series (PEHS)


Personnel economics is the study of contracts between workers and firms. The principal (the employer) hires an agent (the worker) to perform a series of tasks. However, the principal and agent share neither the same underlying objectives nor information sets. This chapter illustrates how research in economic history can help to address challenges relating the employment relationship, including hiring, training, job assignments, and compensation.

JEL Classification

M51 M52 M55 N30 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrew Seltzer
    • 1
  1. 1.Royal Holloway, University of LondonEghamUK

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