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Putnam on Mathematics as Modal Logic

  • Øystein Linnebo
Chapter
Part of the Outstanding Contributions to Logic book series (OCTR, volume 9)

Abstract

Two uses of modal logic to explicate mathematics—due primarily to Hilary Putnam and Charles Parsons—are compared and contrasted. The approaches differ both technically and concerning ontology. Some reasons to push the former approach in the direction of the latter are articulated and discussed.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of OsloOsloNorway

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