Putnam’s Constructivization Argument
We revisit Putnam’s constructivization argument from his Models and Reality, part of his model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. We set out how it was initially put, the commentary and criticisms, and how it can be specifically seen and cast, respecting its underlying logic and in light of Putnam’s contributions to mathematical logic.
KeywordsConstructibility \(V= L\) Model-theoretic argument Metaphysical realism
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