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Evaluation Step 5: Remediability, or the Critical Path to Survival

  • Leila Benali
Chapter
Part of the Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region book series (PDMENA)

Abstract

The test of remediability of Williamson enabled us to conclude that, in the 12 countries which reformed their electricity sector, the Single Byer Model (SBM) appears to be a relevant model so far. But the growth of consumption centres, of distribution companies, and of large industrial centres, with interest to sign bilateral contracts with generators, is a reality. An “SBM plus” (an SBM model where bilateral contracts could be signed) could be one feasible alternative. Market power could be a major impediment for remediability. A well-connected, but still independent, national champion is not necessarily a bad outcome, as long as regulation is strong.

Keywords

Contestable market Bilateral contracts Single buyer model 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leila Benali
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut d’Etudes PolitiquesParisFrance

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