Evaluation Step 4: Credibility

  • Leila Benali
Part of the Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region book series (PDMENA)


The credibility of the reform—or its capacity to provide stability of commitments, and the ability of its governance structure to solve regulatory problems—is critically supported by the design of “effective” regulatory institutions. In MENA, clarity of roles, participation of relevant stakeholders, and accountability are usually guaranteed. The autonomy from political intervention and the predictability of decisions are less certain. The development of robust regulatory frameworks and strong institutions was hampered by under-funding and a reluctance of authorities to transfer independent decision-making to regulatory authorities.

The growth in the volume of subsidies is usually not offset with the hypothetical decrease in production costs due to efficiency and competition. A subsidy applied through fuel pricing can potentially be counter-productive to stimulating efficient use of energy. The restriction of fuel supplies obliged most countries to rethink their position vis-à-vis subsidies. But there are still several constraints affecting the review of subsidies.


Credibility Subsidies Regulation 


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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leila Benali
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut d’Etudes PolitiquesParisFrance

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