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Evaluation Step 3: Attractiveness and Feasibility

  • Leila Benali
Chapter
Part of the Perspectives on Development in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region book series (PDMENA)

Abstract

The concept of attractiveness (economic), with the desirability (political), is central to the analysis of reforms in the neo-institutional economy. The impact on macro-economic policies (industrialization, economic diversification) is a key component of the attractiveness of MENA reforms. The more decentralized the institutional environment is, the less feasible the reform will be without negotiation and spending of political capital. The more rigid the industrial structure is, the longer the reform will be. Time is a critical factor as it increases the probability for the reform to be distorted, reversed or frozen. Transaction costs would be higher in countries with a rigid industrial structure, and it would be more difficult to reverse or to freeze a reform in an advanced stage. In a region where world-class oil and gas reserves are concentrated, the resource endowment of a country impacts the feasibility of a reform, and its process.

Keywords

Attractiveness Desirability Industrial structure Transaction costs Resource endowment 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Leila Benali
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut d’Etudes PolitiquesParisFrance

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