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A ‘Promiscuously Partisan’ Bureaucracy

  • Patrick Diamond
Chapter

Abstract

The cumulative effect of these changes makes the central government machine in the UK ‘promiscuously partisan’ (Aucoin, Governance, 25, 177–199, 2012). Officials are expected to support the government’s agenda. The norms of ‘impartial loyalty’ are displaced by partisanship (Bakvis and Jarvis, Introduction: Peter C. Aucoin: From New Public Management to New Political Governance. In From New Public Management to New Political Governance. McGill-Queens University Press, 2012: 17). The civil service always counselled Ministers on the political dimensions of policy decisions; yet now, substantive advice is outweighed by partisan considerations (Van den Berg, Policy Sciences, 50, 63–84, 2016). Civil servants are required to advocate government policies, persuading the media and stakeholders the government’s measures are in the public interest (Aucoin, Governance, 25, 177–199, 2012). As the civil service ‘monopoly’ over policy-making is weakened, officials are compelled to demonstrate allegiance to Ministers. This chapter will consider the dramatic growth of ‘promiscuous partisanship’ in Whitehall.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Patrick Diamond
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Politics and International RelationsQueen Mary University of LondonLondonUK

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