How to Create the Conditions Where Science Can Help

  • Claire Craig


The process of seeking or providing scientific evidence need not be an amateur activity. The timescales for providing evidence range from hours and days, during civil emergencies such as Fukushima (2011) or Ebola (2016), to decades, in the case of climate change policy. All parties should be informed by a common understanding of how policy issues are framed, of the workings of the policy environment and of science. Sometimes the certainty of the evidence must be traded off against the complexity of the system being considered. Every significant policy issue requires insights from more than one discipline, so the process of providing evidence is also one of enabling disciplinary experts to work together to synthesise scientific evidence in forms accessible to decision-makers and wider publics.


Fukushima Scientific evidence Ecstasy Honest broker Evidence synthesis 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claire Craig
    • 1
  1. 1.Royal SocietyLondonUK

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