Animal Individuality: The Subjective Self
Animal and subjective life-concepts invoke an interiority not found in biological nominalism, aligned with neither physical nor organismic interiority. The traditional conceptions of sensation and locomotion invoked both a vegetable front end, invariably embodied, and something else, a back end where qualia and will might reside. Depending on our definition, modern biology either gives these traits to all organisms or requires numerous “animal” categories for different processes across the phylogenetic spectrum. More problematically, all biological processes, including sensation and locomotion, can be associated with biological consortia as well as biological individuals. Evolutionary proposals, such as those by Millikan and Dennett, and panpsychist proposals, such as those by Mathews, may suggests a way forward by renegotiating Cartesian categories of mind and matter.
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