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Multi-range Decoy I/O Defense of Electrical Substations Against Industrial Control System Malware

  • Julian L. RrushiEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications book series (ASTSA)

Abstract

Industrial control system malware campaigns, such as BlackEnergy and Dragonfly, targeted electrical substations at various ranges relative to the computers that pushed the attacks into substation relays after being infected. Worm-like propagation of industrial control system malware in the Internet traverses paths along computers that may be far from their target, and that often are completely unrelated to power grid functions. Industrial control system malware hop from computer to computer until landing on one that has access to a target industrial environment. Industrial control system malware enabled by spear-phishing or website redirection attacks exploit web browser vulnerabilities coupled with human factors of energy company personnel. Watering hole attacks cause the installation of industrial control system malware on the computers of power grid operators, and sometimes even on the protective relays of an electrical substation. In this chapter we present a line of work that creates and operates industrial mirages, i.e., phantom substation targets for industrial control system malware to pursue, to intercept such malware bound for the power grid. The discussion focuses on decoy I/O. We also generally describe other key elements of industrial mirage at large, and explain how decoy I/O and those elements work together as integral components of the industrial mirage capability. Industrial mirage is able to actively redirect industrial control system malware to decoys, and can sustain prolonged interaction with such malware. We validated this line of work against numerous malware samples involved in recent industrial control system malware campaigns.

Keywords

Industrial control systems Malware Defensive deception. 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research is sponsored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research and the U.S. Air Force Academy Center for Cyberspace Research under agreement number FA7000-16-2-0002. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon.

The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceWestern Washington UniversityBellinghamUSA

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