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From Formal Requirements to Highly Assured Software for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10951)

Abstract

Operational requirements of safety-critical systems are often written in restricted specification logics. These restricted logics are amenable to automated analysis techniques such as model-checking, but are not rich enough to express complex requirements of unmanned systems. This short paper advocates for the use of expressive logics, such as higher-order logic, to specify the complex operational requirements and safety properties of unmanned systems. These rich logics are less amenable to automation and, hence, require the use of interactive theorem proving techniques. However, these logics support the formal verification of complex requirements such as those involving the physical environment. Moreover, these logics enable validation techniques that increase confidence in the correctness of numerically intensive software. These features result in highly-assured software that may be easier to certify. The feasibility of this approach is illustrated with examples drawn for NASA’s unmanned aircraft systems.

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Copyright information

© U.S. Government, as represented by the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. No copyright is claimed in the United States under Title 17, U.S. Code. All Other Rights Reserved. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.NASA Langley Research CenterHamptonUSA

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