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Modular Verification of Programs with Effects and Effect Handlers in Coq

  • Thomas Letan
  • Yann Régis-Gianas
  • Pierre Chifflier
  • Guillaume Hiet
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10951)

Abstract

Modern computing systems have grown in complexity, and the attack surface has increased accordingly. Even though system components are generally carefully designed and even verified by different groups of people, the composition of these components is often regarded with less attention. This paves the way for “architectural attacks”, a class of security vulnerabilities where the attacker is able to threaten the security of the system even if each of its components continues to act as expected. In this article, we introduce FreeSpec, a formalism built upon the key idea that components can be modelled as programs with algebraic effects to be realized by other components. FreeSpec allows for the modular modelling of a complex system, by defining idealized components connected together, and the modular verification of the properties of their composition. In addition, we have implemented a framework for the Coq proof assistant based on FreeSpec.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas Letan
    • 1
    • 2
  • Yann Régis-Gianas
    • 3
    • 4
  • Pierre Chifflier
    • 1
  • Guillaume Hiet
    • 2
  1. 1.French Network Information Security Agency (ANSSI)ParisFrance
  2. 2.CentraleSupélec, Inria Rennes – Bretagne Atlantique, IRISA-D1RennesFrance
  3. 3.Univ Paris Diderot, Sorbonne Paris Cité, IRIF/PPS, UMR 8243 CNRSParisFrance
  4. 4.PiR2, Inria Paris-RocquencourtParisFrance

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