The One Over Many and Its Variations

  • Guido Imaguire
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 397)


The core of the book is presented in this chapter. In it, I offer a solution to the One Over Many problem, which is usually considered the most perspicuous way to formulate the Problem of Universals. I also solve the two variants, the Many Over One and the Similar but Different problems. The last one is particularly interesting because it was exactly formulated in order to show that Old Ostrich Nominalism does not provide an adequate solution to the Problem of Universals. Basically, the solution consists in (i) analysing the ontological commitments of various statements about property distributions (objects sharing the same property, objects having different properties, and different objects that are similar with regard to some and different with regard to other properties), (ii) explaining how to use the notion of grounding to avoid a commitment to properties, and (iii) offering truthmakers and ‘possibilitators’ for such statements.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Guido Imaguire
    • 1
  1. 1.Universidade Federal do Rio de JaneiroRio de JaneiroBrazil

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