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Realizing Oneself by Realizing What One Really Wants to Do

  • Yudai Suzuki
Chapter

Abstract

I will explore the concept of self-realization by means of realizing what one really wants to do, i.e., by realizing the desires one is committed to. I briefly review views of three philosophers, Frankfurt, Watson, and Bratman, and contrast my view with theirs. Unlike Frankfurt and Bratman, I argue that higher order attitudes toward desires are not necessary for the commitment. I agree with Watson that value judgments on desires are necessary, but they are not sufficient for the commitment. My view is that the commitment is partly constituted by intentions based on value judgments through practical reasoning. While my view is similar to Bratman’s in appealing to intentions which are prospective about a future, I add a further element which is retrospective about the past, i.e., the mood of satisfaction.

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am thankful to Lee Taehee and Takuya Niikawa for giving useful comments to the draft of this article. I am also grateful to Momo Deza for her diligent proofreading.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yudai Suzuki
    • 1
  1. 1.International Budo UniversityKatsuuraJapan

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