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Objects of Nature and Objects of Thought

  • Peter RónaEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Virtues and Economics book series (VIEC, volume 3)

Abstract

The subject matter of the economy is unlike that of the natural sciences. It is the product of human intentionality, and as such, it inherently reflects the human judgment that brought it into being. The fundamental ontological diffence between objects found in nature and objects resulting from human intentionality are explored. The domestication of the techniques employed in the natural sciences cannot produce law-like generalisations in economics with the predictive and explanatory power that characterises the laws of the natural sciences. Modern economics has been most convincing when it has paid attention to the problems caused by the lack of homogeneity in the reality it examines. Studies addressing small, spatially and temporally well defined issues offering a generous supply of empirically verifiable evidence have been more effective in guiding us as to what should be than those aiming for the formation of law-like generalisations of universal applicability.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Blackfriars HallUniversity of OxfordOxfordUK

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