The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future

  • Andrew PostlewaiteEmail author
  • David Schmeidler
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


There are two parts in our note. The first highlights Leo’s contribution that earned him the Nobel prize in economics, from a personal point of view. The second discusses further questions that can naturally be addressed using Leo’s conceptual framework.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA
  2. 2.Tel-Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael

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