Social Design pp 337-348 | Cite as

Contextual Mechanism Design

  • Pierfrancesco La MuraEmail author
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


The context in which a mechanism is defined and meant to operate plays an important role, and in more than one way. We advocate a contextual approach to mechanism design, that extends to both non-classical aspects of decision and of the physical and information-theoretic environment in which the mechanism operates. We demonstrate the approach in two applications: one to auctions with ambiguity, and one to decentralized decision-making.



We are grateful to Adam Brandenburger and Lukasz Swiatczak for valuable comments. Financial support from the German Bundesbank is gratefully acknowledged.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.HHL Leipzig Graduate School of ManagementLeipzigGermany

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