Social Design pp 307-322 | Cite as

Mechanisms in a Digitalized World

  • Gabrielle DemangeEmail author
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


Due to computing and communication facilities, formal procedures, often referred to as “algorithms,” are now extensively used in public, economic, and social areas. These procedures, currently at the forefront of criticisms, share some features with mechanisms as defined by economists, following Hurwicz. My aim is to investigate these relationships and to discuss some of the economic risks generated by the power of algorithms.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Paris School of Economics-EHESSParisFrance

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