Social Design pp 219-231 | Cite as

Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules

  • Souvik Roy
  • Soumyarup Sadhukhan
  • Arunava Sen
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


We characterize unanimous and strategy-proof random social choice functions in the classical committee formation model in terms of the properties of marginal decomposability and monotonicity. We show that if committees of a fixed size have to be selected, then an onto and strategy-proof random social choice function must be an appropriately defined random dictatorship.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Souvik Roy
    • 1
  • Soumyarup Sadhukhan
    • 1
  • Arunava Sen
    • 2
  1. 1.Economic Research UnitIndian Statistical InstituteKolkataIndia
  2. 2.Economics and Planning UnitIndian Statistical InstituteDelhiIndia

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