Consciousness: Metaphysical Speculations and Supposed Distinctions

  • Grant Gillett


The human soul and consciousness are active in the world of nature as part of the origins of things and situations informed by human symbolism and propositionising. Therefore the soul introduces human creativity, relationships, reasoning, and imagination into a world of contingency and brute causality, turning it into a partly humanly constructed world. That transformation changes everything through a special kind of non-linearity in which human meanings inflect what happens in our adaptive niche and embeds us in symbolism, culture, and flows of life that transcend causal mechanisms and put human relationships and imagination at the heart of the world shaping us. We therefore become enchanted, storied beings realising forms of life that do not require mystifying varieties of metaphysics to explain their richness.


Consciousness and deflationary metaphysics Moral being 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Grant Gillett
    • 1
  1. 1.Dunedin School of MedicineUniversity of OtagoDunedinNew Zealand

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