Second Nature, the Will, and Human Neuroscience

  • Grant Gillett


Second nature is what we create in ourselves on the basis of natural capacities comprising first (biological) nature. The self-configuration doing that creative work is an enactive version of what we do all the time. We think of a way things are not but might be (with a little bit of this and a little bit of that) and we make it so. The human will as an origin of what is not but could be brings forth out of thought—the active links we forge between things based on our forms of life—new things. This bringing forth is a creative force in the world that we call the human will. It is always going beyond what is and making what is not (the imaginary) into something real.


The will Free will and self-formation Non-linear dynamics Social discursive and political function 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Grant Gillett
    • 1
  1. 1.Dunedin School of MedicineUniversity of OtagoDunedinNew Zealand

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