Consciousness, Value, and Human Nature

  • Grant Gillett


Human consciousness emerges from neural evolution as a complex and densely woven whole in which doing and perceiving things and the use of language combine to open up the world for human engagement. That integrated whole can be disrupted by breakdowns in its neurological fabric or in its psychological weaving together through human communication and the shared use of symbols and our relationships with each other. When it functions well, that woven whole engenders certain values—the value of crafted things whose purposefulness can be discerned and contemplated but not fully subsumed by functional considerations and the value of our jointly constructed ethos of mutuality, cooperation, and achievement. Those values respectively inform and emerge from the discourses of art and morality.


Second nature Value and valuing Rationality sociality and dependency 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Grant Gillett
    • 1
  1. 1.Dunedin School of MedicineUniversity of OtagoDunedinNew Zealand

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