Advertisement

Promoting National Interest: Foreign Policy and the International Lending Institutions

  • Victoria PistikouEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Contributions to Economics book series (CE)

Abstract

The paper’s objective is to examine whether a state’s national interest and influence are promoted through international institutions. It relies on the theory of Realism, according to which institutions enable states to coordinate even though there are asymmetric benefits for each state, since power is the decisive variable which defines how each institution is formed and operates. The analytical framework of this paper is developed within the confines of international political economy. The dependent variable is national interest, and the independent variables are international development cooperation (on a bilateral level) and shareholding in international lending institutions. The focus is on these variables because each directly affects the national sovereignty of the recipient country and alters its domestic structure. By examining the case of the United States (through the USAID) and its role in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, conflict-engaged countries and crucial to US interests, I conclude that international lending institutions mainly promote the national interest of the leading power within the institutions.

Keywords

Realism Foreign policy International development cooperation National interest International lending institutions 

JEL Classification Codes

F35 F50 F52 

References

  1. Foot, R., MacFarlane, S. N., & Mastanduno, M. (Eds.). (2003). U.S. hegemony and international organizations: The United States and multilateral institutions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Gilpin, R. (1981). War and change in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Gilpin, R. (2002). Παγκόσμια Πολιτική Οικονομία: Η Διεθνής Οικονομική Τάξη. Αθήνα: Ποιότητα.Google Scholar
  4. Grieco, J. (1988). Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institution. International Organization, 42(3), 485–507.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Keohane, R. O. (1972). The multinational enterprise and world political economy. International Organization, 26(01), 84–120.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Keohane, R. O., & Martin, L. L. (1995). The promise of institutionalist theory. International Security, 20(1), 39–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2001). Power and interdependence. New York: Longman Publishing Group.Google Scholar
  8. Krasner, S. D. (1985). Structural conflict: The third world against global liberalism. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  9. Krasner, S. D. (2001). Rethinking the sovereign state model. Review of International Studies, 27(05), 17–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Machiavelli, N. (1988). In Q. Skinner (Ed.), The prince. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Mastanduno, M. (1998). Economics and security in statecraft and scholarship. International Organization, 52(4), 825–854.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Mearsheimer, J. (1995). The false promise of institutional institutions. In M. Brown, S. M. Lynn-Jones, & S. E. Miller (Eds.), The perils of anarchy (pp. 332–376). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  13. Mearsheimer, J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: W.W. Norton.Google Scholar
  14. Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace (2nd ed.). New York, Knopf.Google Scholar
  15. O’ Brien, R., & Wlliams, M. (2011). Global political economy. Athens: Papazisi (in Greek as O’ Brien, R. και Wlliams, M. (2011). Παγκόσμια Πολιτική Οικονομία. Αθήνα: Παπαζήση).Google Scholar
  16. Papasotiriou, X. (2009). American political system and foreign policy: 1945–2002. Vari: Poiotita (in Greek as Παπασωτηρίου, Χ. (2009). Αμερικανικό Πολιτικό Σύστημα και Εξωτερική Πολιτική: 1945–2002. Βάρη: Ποιότητα).Google Scholar
  17. Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics, 51(01), 144–172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Ruggie, J. G. (1992). Multilateralism: The anatomy of an institution. International Organization, 46(03), 561–598.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Schweller, R. (1996). Neo-realism’s status-quo bias: What security dilemma? Security Studies, 5, 90–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Sklias, P. (2001). International political economy: The Balkans, The Central and Eastern Europe, The Countries of the USSR and their Relations with the European Union. Athens: Papazisi (in Greek as Σκλιάς, Π. (2001). Διεθνής Πολιτική Οικονομία: Τα Βαλκάνια, Η Κεντρική και η Ανατολική Ευρώπη (ΚΑΕ), οι Χώρες της Πρώην ΕΣΣΔ και οι Σχέσεις τους με την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Αθήνα: Παπαζήσης).Google Scholar
  21. Thucydides. ([1954]1972). The Peloponnesian War (R. Warner, Trans.). London: Penguin.Google Scholar
  22. Walt, S. (2002). The enduring relevance of the realist tradition. In I. Katznelson & H. Milner (Eds.), Political science: The state of the discipline. New York: W.W. Norton.Google Scholar
  23. Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.Google Scholar
  24. Zakaria, F. (1998). From wealth to power: The unusual origins of America’s world role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

Internet Sources

  1. IMF (1). (2017). IMF executive directors and voting power. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx
  2. IMF (2). (2017). Lending by the IMF. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from https://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm
  3. IMF (3). (2017). IMF lending at a glance. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/map/lending/
  4. IMF (4). (2017). Article IV consultation with Afghanistan 14/11/2011. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2011/pn11140.htm
  5. IMF (5). (2017). Afghanistan and the IMF. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://www.imf.org/external/country/AFG/index.htm
  6. IMF (6). (2017). Executive board concludes 2011 article IV consultation and proposal for post-program monitoring with Pakistan”. Date viewed March 6, 2017, from http://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/pn1210
  7. IMF (7). (2017). Executive board approves 3-year, US$6.64 billion extended arrangement for Pakistan. Date viewed March 6, 2017, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13322.htm
  8. IMF (8). (2017). Pakistan and the IMF. Date viewed March 8, 2017, from http://www.imf.org/external/country/PAK/index.htm
  9. IMF (9). (2017). Iraq: Letter of intent, memorandum of economic and financial policies, and technical memorandum of understanding. February 8, 2010. Date viewed March 8, 2017, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/2010/irq/020810.pdf
  10. IMF (10). (2017). Press release: IMF executive board approves US$3.6 billion stand-by arrangement for Iraq. February 24, 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr1060.htm
  11. IMF (11). (2017). IMF executive board approves US$5.34 billion stand-by arrangement for Iraq. July 7, 2016. Date viewed March 8, 2017, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2016/pr16321.htm
  12. IMF (12). (2017). Iraq and the IMF. Date viewed March 14, 2017, from http://www.imf.org/external/country/IRQ/index.htm
  13. Marshall Plan. (1948). Date viewed March 14, 2017, from https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan
  14. Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. (2015). Enduring leadership in a dynamic world. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/267396.pdf
  15. U.S. Department of State (1). (2017). Bureau of budget and planning. Date viewed March 19, 2017, from https://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/index.htm#mission
  16. U.S. Department of State (2). (2017). President’s fiscal year 2018 budget outline released today. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/268480.htm
  17. U.S. Department of State (3). (2017). U.S. relations with Iraq. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm
  18. U.S. Department of State (4). (2017). U.S. relations with Pakistan. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm
  19. U.S. Department of State (5). (2017). U.S. relations with Afghanistan. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm
  20. USAID (1). (2017). Congressional budget justification. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from https://www.usaid.gov/results-and-data/budget-spending/congressional-budget-justification
  21. USAID (2). (2017). Mission, vision and values. Date viewed March 14, 2017, from https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values
  22. USAID (3). (2017). Where we work. Date viewed March 22, 2017, from https://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work
  23. USAID (4). (2017). USAID’s investments in Afghanistan—Dollars to results. Date viewed March 22, 2017, from https://results.usaid.gov/afghanistan#fy2015
  24. USAID (5). (2017). USAID’s investments in Pakistan—Dollars to results. Date viewed March 22, 2017, from https://results.usaid.gov/pakistan#fy2015
  25. USAID (6). (2017). USAID’s investments in Iraq—Dollars to results. Date viewed March 20, 2017, from https://results.usaid.gov/iraq#fy2015
  26. World Bank (1). (2017). International Bank For Reconstruction And Development—Subscriptions and voting power of member countries. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf
  27. World Bank (2). (2017). International Finance Corporation—Subscriptions and voting power of member countries. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IFCCountryVotingTable.pdf
  28. World Bank (3). (2017). International Development Association—Voting power of member countries. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IDACountryVotingTable.pdf
  29. World Bank (4). (2017). Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency—Subscriptions and voting power of member countries. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/MIGACountryVotingTable.pdf
  30. World Bank (5). (2017). Member countries. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members
  31. World Bank (6). (2017). LENDING Afghanistan: Commitments by Fiscal Year (in millions of dollars). Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview
  32. World Bank (7). (2017). Country at a Glance: Afghanistan. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan
  33. World Bank (8). (2017). Strategy. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview#3
  34. World Bank (9). (2017). LENDING Pakistan: Commitments by Fiscal Year (in millions of dollars). Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview
  35. World Bank (10). (2017). Context. Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview#1
  36. World Bank (11). (2017). LENDING Iraq: Commitments by Fiscal Year (in millions of dollars). Date viewed March 31, 2017, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq/overview

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of International and European StudiesUniversity of PiraeusPiraeusGreece
  2. 2.Center of International and European Political Economy and GovernanceUniversity of the PeloponneseCorinthGreece

Personalised recommendations