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Methodological Foundations

  • Joachim WeimannEmail author
  • Jeannette Brosig-Koch
Chapter
Part of the Springer Texts in Business and Economics book series (STBE)

Abstract

Now that we have prepared the stage for experimental economics in the first chapter, the second chapter deals with the methodological foundations. The times are long gone when economists “just did an experiment” to see what happens when you let subjects play games. In the meantime, methodological standards and procedures have evolved. Following these procedures is an important prerequisite for obtaining experimental results that can claim to meet the scientific standards of the economics profession. We have put the most important methodological fundamentals into groups, each of which is based on one component of an experiment.

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Otto-von-Guericke University MagdeburgMagdeburgGermany
  2. 2.University of Duisburg-EssenEssenGermany

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