The Co-construction of Modern Futures Markets, 1923–1926

  • Rasheed SaleuddinEmail author
Part of the Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance book series (PSHF)


One key result of the weak Grain Futures Act of 1922 was the formation of a new technocratic overseer that was allowed to investigate suspected manipulation and fraud, and make detailed reports to the public, grain market users and Congress. During most of the interwar years, the US Administration and Congress had no desire to control the markets with further legislation. However, there were still significant problems with the markets that could not and would not be addressed by the Chicago Board of Trade membership. Pragmatic leaders of the Board worked closely with the US Federal Government and the regulators to convince the members to adopt three key improvements to the markets: modern clearing, Business Conduct Committees (BCC) operated by the Board but using information gathered by the government and the requirement for large traders to report their positions. Markets could not have effected these critical changes, important even in today’s markets, on their own.


Market co-construction Modern clearing house Co-regulation 



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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Endowment Asset ManagementUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK

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