Introduction: The Interwar Coming of Age of Modern Futures Markets, Institutions and Governance

  • Rasheed SaleuddinEmail author
Part of the Palgrave Studies in the History of Finance book series (PSHF)


This introduction to the story of how US government and industry co-constructed many critical modern futures institutions and governance during the interwar years begins with a scene that took place in 1922. Soon after the first (grain—especially wheat and corn) futures regulation was passed, and anti-markets rhetoric was widespread, the Secretary of the dominant exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, wrote to the directorate stating candidly that the legislation was as pro-futures as was possible, and that it was effectively authored by the futures industry in private collaboration with the US government. This chapter introduces a new archive, now once again inaccessible, and uses that record to argue that the behind-the-scenes negotiation and end results bore no resemblance to the public story of how futures markets were modernised and then regulated.


Futures markets Grain futures Interwar Financial regulation Financial history 



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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Endowment Asset ManagementUniversity of CambridgeCambridgeUK

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