The Time-Consistent Shapley Value for Two-Stage Network Games with Pairwise Interactions
In this paper, cooperative network games with pairwise interactions are considered. The cooperative version of games is investigated. For a particular type of networks, a simplified formula for the Shapley value based on a constructed characteristic function is derived. The time inconsistency of the Shapley value is shown.
This research was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (grant No. 17-11-01079).
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