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Board of Directors and Corporate Networks

  • Wesley Mendes-Da-Silva
Chapter

Abstract

Social network analysis (SNA) is an emerging research field in finance. This chapter references SNA and knowledge of corporate governance, to deal with a similarly emerging topic in finance, board interlocking, and shall examine the validity of the small-world model in a relevant emerging market and the existence of associations between the firm’s worth and its network of corporate relationships. This study references official data relating to more than 400 listed companies. The main results suggest that the network configuration of the relationships between board members and companies reflects the small-world model. Furthermore, there seems to be a significant relationship between the firm’s worth and its network centrality, described according to an “inverted U” type curve, which suggests optimum values exist for social prominence in the corporate network.

Keywords

Corporate governance Corporate networks Social networks Board interlocking 

JEL Code

G34 L14 C91 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wesley Mendes-Da-Silva
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Sao Paulo School of Business Administration (FGV/EAESP)Sao PauloBrazil
  2. 2.University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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