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Quantal Theory in Operations Management

  • Yefen Chen
  • Yanan Song
Chapter

Abstract

In recent decades, numerous studies on commercial operations have found that human managers are not perfectly rational and their behavioral preferences influence the performance of operations systems. Thus, efficient operations have to account for innate human or situation-based behavioral preferences for their optimization. In this chapter, we introduce a quantal theory, which provides a descriptive model to consider bounded rationality in analyzing operational decisions, based on the assumption that decision-makers make mistakes in calculating payoffs. We organize the applications of quantal theory in operations management, and show how to properly develop an informative behavioral model to analyze operational problems. Further, we discuss how to accommodate bounded rationality into humanitarian operations.

Keywords

Quantal theory Decision error Behavioral preferences Bounded rationality Operations management problems 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their guidance and constructive comments. The authors would also like to thank the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71501004) for its support.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yefen Chen
    • 1
  • Yanan Song
    • 2
  1. 1.Cainiao Smart Logistics NetworkHangzhouChina
  2. 2.Academy of Mathematics and System Sciences, Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina

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