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Material Dialogues

  • Shahid Rahman
  • Zoe McConaughey
  • Ansten Klev
  • Nicolas Clerbout
Chapter
Part of the Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning book series (LARI, volume 18)

Abstract

As pointed out by Krabbe (1985, p. 297), material dialogues—that is, dialogues in which propositions have content—receive in the writings of Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz priority over formal dialogues: material dialogues constitute the locus where the logical constants are introduced. However in the standard dialogical framework, since both material and formal dialogues marshal a purely syntactic notion of the formal rule—through which logical validity is defined—, this contentual feature is bypassed, with this consequence that Krabbe and others after him considered that, after all, formal dialogues had priority over material ones.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Shahid Rahman
    • 1
  • Zoe McConaughey
    • 2
    • 3
  • Ansten Klev
    • 4
  • Nicolas Clerbout
    • 5
  1. 1.Département de philosophie CNRS, UMR 8163 - STL - Savoirs Textes LangageUniv. LilleLilleFrance
  2. 2.Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 8163 - STL - Savoirs Textes LangageLilleFrance
  3. 3.Département de philosophie & Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Science et TechnologieUniversité du Québec à MontréalMontréalCanada
  4. 4.Institute of PhilosophyCzech Academy of SciencesPragueCzechia
  5. 5.Universidad de ValparaísoValparaísoChile

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