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The Republic of Science and Its Constitution: Some Reflections on Scientific Methods as Institutions

Chapter

Abstract

Jarvie’s Popper’s social view of science from Logik der Forschung to The Open Society and Its Enemies is used to discuss whether the “proto-constitution” of science that, according to Jarvie, Popper formulated is a sound justification of a falsificationist methodology, and whether the view of society and of social science grounding Popper’s views could be substituted for some more updated insights from contemporary social science. In particular, I defend that a game-theoretic view to the choice of norms, one that takes into account the large variety of real goals and real agents having some role in the scientific process, would be a more appropriate approach to understand the “constitution of science.”

Notes

Acknowledgements

The author thanks Spain’s government research projects PRX14-00007 and FFI2014-57258-P.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUNED, National Distance Education UniversityMadridSpain

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