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Externality

  • Gerald K. Harrison
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion book series (PFPR)

Abstract

There is no evidence that the favoring relations constitutive of normative reasons have oneself as their source. Indeed, the thesis is preposterous once the truth of the unity thesis is acknowledged. All of the evidence—and I provide four pieces (empirical evidence, phenomenological evidence; the categoricity of some normative reasons and the fact we acquire a priori information from our reason)—strongly implies that normative reasons have an external-to-any-of-us source. I also consider and reject some analyses of normative reasons—ideal observer theories and constitutivist views—that some may mistakenly believe are still in the running. I conclude at this point that Reason is a single external mind with normative reasons being what she favours us doing and being.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald K. Harrison
    • 1
  1. 1.Massey UniversityPalmerston NorthNew Zealand

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