All favoring relations must have a mind as their bearer. The idea of a favoring attitude being borne by something non-mental is incoherent, as is the idea of a favoring attitude that lacks any bearer at all. As all normative reasons are favoring relations, then all normative reasons must have a mind to bear them. This means that all objectivist naturalist and non-naturalist analyses of normative reasons are false, indeed incoherent. They all, by definition, turn out either to be identifying normative reasons with something other than a favoring relation, or to be supposing that favoring relations can be borne by something other than a mind, be it either some objective natural or non-natural feature, or nothing whatsoever.
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