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How Political and Economic Processes Are Related to Education Inequality

  • Nichole Torpey-Saboe
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter lays out a theory of how political and economic processes are related to education inequality. Torpey-Saboe outlines the relevant actors and the preferences that shape their choices, then details a theory on how the type of political regime and the economic processes of modernization and globalization should affect the costs and benefits of education for both individuals and governments. Democratization should increase the benefits to government for providing broad access to education and the benefits to individuals of attaining that education. Modernization should also increase the benefits of education and reduce the costs for both governments and individuals. The effects of globalization will vary depending on the structure of the economy. For labor-abundant countries, globalization should increase the benefits to government for providing broad-based education and the benefits to individuals for staying in school. For capital- and land-abundant countries, however, globalization may not bring these same benefits.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nichole Torpey-Saboe
    • 1
  1. 1.Colorado Department of Higher EducationDenverUSA

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