Regress Issues and Action Scepticism

  • David-Hillel Ruben


This chapter has two sections, both of which develop some of the consequences of one-particularism. The first section is about the possibility that some regress, vicious or otherwise, arises on the conjunction of one-particularism and the left-to-right inference of (PT), since I accept both of those conjuncts.

The second question is a sceptical question. Could there be a possible world in which no other agents, minded like ourselves, ever act, either intentionally or unintentionally, although, for all the events that would have been intrinsic or extrinsic to their actions had they acted, there are intrinsically qualitatively identical mere events that occur anyway? If there were such a possible world, how would a person know whether the world that he is in is that world or some other world in which the other agents really do act?

Do I solve the sceptical question about knowledge of the actions of others that I introduce? No. I tentatively outline (but do not commit myself to) a ‘disjunctivist’ suggestion for addressing the sceptical question. The discussion on scepticism also allows me to apply (CTT) from Chap.  4 and to demonstrate how it works in thinking about this question about others’ actions. It also allows me to make some points of (I believe) some interest about the epistemology of action.


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • David-Hillel Ruben
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of LondonLondonUK

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