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Explanatory Limits in the Cognitive Science of Religion: Theoretical Matrix and Evidence Levels

Chapter
Part of the New Approaches to the Scientific Study of Religion book series (NASR, volume 4)

Abstract

Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) has developed for almost 20 years naturalistic explanations on religious mind and behavior, opening that field to scientific scrutiny. Scholars used to study religion from a more humanistic tradition or a hermeneutic approach could feel surprised by the application of biological-evolutionary, cognitive and neurological means to better explain religion. Not too confident with the new approach, many traditional students of religion, like theologians, religion philosophers, phenomenologists, and even psychologists, were often dazzled by the exhibition of new terms, concepts and ways to understand religion, beyond the traditional frames. Time is ripe for an assessment on the plausibility that these new theories exhibit, taking into account their respective frameworks and the reported empirical evidence.

Keywords

Cognitive science of religion Mentalizing Autism spectrum disorder Cultural evolution Explanation of religion Cognitive bias Modulariry of mind Computational theory of mind 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Pontifical University Antonianum RomeRomeItaly

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