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Conclusion

  • Hirokazu Kikuchi
Chapter
Part of the IDE-JETRO Series book series (IDE)

Abstract

This chapter concludes the discussion about the subnational electoral connection and senatorial behavior. Conducting a simulation based on the statistical models introduced in the previous chapters, it shows that the tenure stability of governors seriously hurts the president’s legislative success in the Senate. Referring to the cases of Brazil and Mexico, this chapter also claims that the theoretical framework of this book holds beyond the Argentine context.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Developing EconomiesJapan External Trade OrganizationChibaJapan

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