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Bosses at the Frontline

  • Hirokazu Kikuchi
Chapter
Part of the IDE-JETRO Series book series (IDE)

Abstract

This chapter provides qualitative and quantitative evidence of floor voting in the Argentine Senate, paying attention to the sequential nature of the legislative process. Analyzing the case of Resolution 125 and a novel dataset on roll-call votes, it reveals that high-profile senators (e.g., former presidents and governors) and their fellows are very active on the floor. Their positon-taking strategies led to a historical tie-breaking vote cast by Vice-President Julio Cobos. However, the analysis on roll-call votes also showed that they just vote against a limited number of targeted presidential bills if they are affiliated with the president’s party. By contrast, longstanding governors tend to ask their senators to support presidential initiatives on the floor, because they have already screened out unwanted ones in committees.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Developing EconomiesJapan External Trade OrganizationChibaJapan

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