Advertisement

Political Careers and the Legislative Process under Federalism

  • Hirokazu Kikuchi
Chapter
Part of the IDE-JETRO Series book series (IDE)

Abstract

Kikuchi offers a theory on the subnational electoral connection, in which national legislators’ actions aim at attracting subnational political actors for their career advancement. Criticizing the dominant assumption in comparative politics that legislators have the same incentives under the same electoral rule, this chapter claims that senators strategically choose between credit-claiming and position-taking activities through the legislative process depending on the characteristics of their principals at the subnational level. According to the author’s framework, senators who follow longstanding governors claim credits for shelving unwelcomed presidential bills in committees, whereas first-tier politicians in the Senate engage in position-taking on the floor.

References

  1. Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  2. Alemán, Eduardo, and Ernesto Calvo. 2008. “Analyzing Legislative Success in Latin America: The Case of Democratic Argentina.” In New Voices in Studies in the Study of Democracy in Latin America, edited by Guillermo O’Donnell, Joseph S. Tulchin, and Augusto Varas with Adam Stubits, 9–37. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center.Google Scholar
  3. Alemán, Eduardo, Ernesto Calvo, Mark P. Jones, and Noah Kaplan. 2009. “Comparing Cosponsorship and Roll-Call Ideal Points.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34 (1): 87–116. Google Scholar
  4. Alston, Lee J., Marcus André Melo, Bernardo Mueller, and Carlos Pereira. 2008. “On the Road to Good Governance: Recovering from Economic and Political Shocks in Brazil.” In Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shape Policies, edited by Ernesto Stein, Mariano Tommasi, Pablo T. Spiller, and Carlos Scartascini, 111–153. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Ames, Barry. 2001. The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  6. Ansolabehere, Stephen, John Mark Hansen, Shigeo Hirano, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 2007. “The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Primary Elections.” Electoral Studies 26 (3): 660–668.Google Scholar
  7. Barrett, Andrew W., and Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha. 2007. “Presidential Success on the Substance of Legislation.” Political Research Quarterly 60 (1): 100–112.Google Scholar
  8. Bernick, E. Lee. 1979. “Gubernatorial Tools: Formal vs. Informal.” The Journal of Politics 41 (2): 656–664.Google Scholar
  9. Beyle, Thad L. 1990. “Governors.” In Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, 5th ed., edited by Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines, 201–251. Boston: Little Brown.Google Scholar
  10. Bonvecchi, Alejandro, and Germán Lodola. 2011. “The Dual Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers: Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Coalition-Building in Argentina.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 41 (2): 179–206.Google Scholar
  11. Botana, Natalio R. 1977. El Orden Conservador: La Política Argentina entre 1880 y 1916. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.Google Scholar
  12. Bovitz, Gregory L., and Jamie L. Carson. 2006. “Position-Taking and Electoral Accountability in the U.S. House of Representatives.” Political Research Quarterly 59 (2): 297–312.Google Scholar
  13. Brusco, Valeria, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan Stokes. 2004. “Vote Buying in Argentina.” Latin American Research Review 39 (2): 66–88.Google Scholar
  14. Burdman, Julio. 2010. “Alfas, Ranas y Testimoniales: La Cultura Política de las Elecciones Legislativas de Medio Término en Argentina.” POSTData 15 (1): 33–74.Google Scholar
  15. Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  16. Calvo, Ernesto. 2007. “The Responsive Legislature: Public Opinion and Law Making in a Highly Disciplined Legislature.” British Journal of Political Science 37 (2): 263–280.Google Scholar
  17. ———. 2014. Legislator Success in Fragmented Congresses in Argentina: Plurality Cartels, Minority Presidents, and Lawmaking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Calvo, Ernesto, and Marcelo Escolar. 2005. La Nueva Política de Partidos en la Argentina: Crisis Política, Realineamientos Partidarios, y Reforma Electoral. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.Google Scholar
  19. Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. “Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market.” American Journal of Political Science 48 (4): 742–757.Google Scholar
  20. Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2001. “A Theory of Presidents’ Public Agenda Setting.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (2): 183–208.Google Scholar
  21. Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Scott de Marchi. 2002. “Presidential Approval and Legislative Success.” The Journal of Politics 64 (2): 491–509.Google Scholar
  22. Carey, John M. 2008. Legislative Voting and Accountability. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  23. Carey, John M., and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14 (4): 417–439.Google Scholar
  24. Cheibub, José Antonio, Argelina Figueiredo, and Fernando Limongi. 2009. “Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies, 1988–2006.” Latin American Politics and Society 51 (1): 1–30.Google Scholar
  25. Cohen, Jeffrey E. 1997. Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy-Making: The Public and the Policies That Presidents Choose. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  26. Cohen, Marty, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John Zaller. 2008. The Party Decides: Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  27. Corrales, Javier. 2002. Presidents Without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
  28. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1986. “Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game.” The Journal of Politics 48 (2): 370–389.Google Scholar
  29. ———. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  30. ———. 2005. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Crisp, Brian F., and Scott W. Desposato. 2004. “Constituency Building in Multimember Districts: Collusion or Conflict?” The Journal of Politics 66 (1): 136–156.Google Scholar
  32. De Luca, Miguel. 2008. “Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Argentina: Presidents and Governors, 1983 to 2006.” In Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, edited by Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern, 189–217. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
  33. De Luca, Miguel, Mark P. Jones, and Maria Ines Tula. 2002. “Back Rooms or Ballot Boxes? Candidate Nomination in Argentina.” Comparative Political Studies 35 (4): 413–436.Google Scholar
  34. Den Hartog, Chris, and Nathan W. Monroe. 2008. “Agenda Influence and Tabling Motions in the U.S. Senate.” In Why Not Parties? Party Effects in the United States Senate, edited by Nathan W. Monroe, Jason M. Roberts, and David W. Rohde, 142–158. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  35. Desposato, Scott W. 2004. “The Impact of Federalism on National Party Cohesion in Brazil.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29 (2): 259–285.Google Scholar
  36. Desposato, Scott W. 2006. “Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies.” American Journal of Political Science 50 (1): 62–80.Google Scholar
  37. Diaz-Cayeros, Alberto. 2006. Federalism, Fiscal Authority, and Centralization in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  38. Dilger, Robert J., George A. Krause, and Randolph R. Moffett. 1995. “State Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Effectiveness.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20 (4): 553–571.Google Scholar
  39. Dometrius, Nelson C. 1987. “Changing Gubernatorial Power: The Measure vs. Reality.” The Western Political Quarterly 40 (2): 319–328.Google Scholar
  40. Eaton, Kent. 2002a. Politicians and Economic Reform in New Democracies: Argentina and the Philippines in the 1990s. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
  41. ———. 2002b. “Fiscal Policy Making in the Argentine Legislature.” In Legislative Politics in Latin America, edited by Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, 287–314. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  42. Edwards, George C., III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Heaven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  43. Edwards, George C., III, and B. Dan Wood. 1999. “Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media.” American Political Science Review 93 (2): 327–344.Google Scholar
  44. Elazar, Daniel J. 1997. “Contrasting Unitary and Federal Systems.” International Political Science Review 18 (3): 237–251.Google Scholar
  45. Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew, and Jeffrey S. Peake. 2005. “Presidents and the Economic Agenda.” Political Research Quarterly 58 (1): 127–138.Google Scholar
  46. Fenno, Richard F. 1978. Home Style: House Members in Their Districts. New York: HarperCollins.Google Scholar
  47. Ferguson, Margaret R., and Jay Barth. 2002. “Governors in the Legislative Arena: The Importance of Personality in Shaping Success.” Political Psychology 23 (4): 787–808.Google Scholar
  48. Filippov, Mikhail, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova. 2004. Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  49. Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. New Heaven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  50. Fording, Richard C., Neal D. Woods, and David Prince. 2002. “Explaining Gubernatorial Success in State Legislatures.” Prepared for the Delivery at the Second Annual Conference on State Politics and Policy: Legislatures and Representation in the United States, University of Wisconsin, May 24–25, in Milwaukee.Google Scholar
  51. Gélineau, François, and Karen L. Remmer. 2006. “Political Decentralization and Electoral Accountability: The Argentine Experience, 1983–2001.” British Journal of Political Science 36 (1): 133–157.Google Scholar
  52. Gibson, Edward L. 2004. “Federalism and Democracy: Theoretical Connections and Cautionary Insights.” In Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Edward L. Gibson, 1–28. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
  53. ———. 2005. “Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Democratic Countries.” World Politics 58 (1): 101–132.Google Scholar
  54. ———. 2012. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  55. Gibson, Edward L., Ernesto F. Calvo, and Tulia G. Falleti. 2004. “Reallocative Federalism: Legislative Overrepresentation and Public Spending in the Western Hemisphere.” In Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Edward L. Gibson, 173–196. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
  56. González, Lucas I. 2016. Presidents, Governors, and the Politics of Distribution in Federal Democracies: Primus contra pares in Argentina and Brazil. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  57. Gordin, Jorge P. 2004. Unraveling the Politics of Decentralization: Argentina and Spain in Comparative Perspective. Ph.D. Dissertation Submitted to the University of Pittsburgh.Google Scholar
  58. Haider, Donald H. 1974. When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying. New York: The Free Press.Google Scholar
  59. Hanson, Russell L. 2004. “Intergovernmental Relations.” In Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, 8th ed., edited by Virginia Gray and Russell L. Hanson, 31–61. Washington, DC: CQ Press.Google Scholar
  60. Hill, Kim Quaile, and Patricia A. Hurley. 1999. “Dyadic Representation Reappraised.” American Journal of Political Science 43 (1): 109–137.Google Scholar
  61. Hix, Simon. 2004. “Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament.” World Politics 56 (2): 194–223.Google Scholar
  62. Jacobson, Gary C. 1981. “Incumbents’ Advantages in the 1978 U.S. Congressional Elections.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 6 (2): 183–200.Google Scholar
  63. Jones, Mark P. 2001. “Political Institutions and Public Policy in Argentina: An Overview of the Formation and Execution of the National Budget.” In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, 149–182. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  64. ———. 2002. “Party Discipline in the Argentine Congress.” In Legislative Politics in Latin America, edited by Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, 147–184. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  65. ———. 2008. “The Recruitment and Selection of Legislative Candidates in Argentina.” In Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, edited by Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern, 41–75. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
  66. Jones, Mark P., and Wonjae Hwang. 2005a. “Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (2): 267–282.Google Scholar
  67. ———. 2005b. “Provincial Party Bosses: Keystone of the Argentine Congress.” In Argentine Democracy: The Politics of Institutional Weakness, edited by Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo, 115–138. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
  68. Jones, Mark P., Sebastian Saiegh, Pablo Spiller, and Mariano Tommasi. 2002. “Amateur Legislators-Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 356–369.Google Scholar
  69. Kerevel, Yann P. 2015. “(Sub)National Principals, Legislative Agents: Patronage and Political Careers in Mexico.” Comparative Political Studies 48 (8): 1020–1050.Google Scholar
  70. Kikuchi, Hirokazu. 2011. A Dataset on Committee Voting Behavior in the Argentine Senate, 1983–2007. Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh.Google Scholar
  71. ———. 2012. A Dataset on Floor Voting Behavior in the Argentine Senate, 1983–2007. Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh.Google Scholar
  72. Kikuchi, Hirokazu, and Germán Lodola. 2008. “Political Careerism and Legislative Behavior: The Case of the Argentine Senate.” Prepared for Delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28–31, in Boston.Google Scholar
  73. ———. 2014. “The Effects of Gubernatorial Influence and Political Careerism on Senatorial Voting Behavior: The Argentine Case.” Journal of Politics in Latin America 6 (2): 73–105.Google Scholar
  74. Kingdon, John W. 1977. “Models of Legislative Voting.” The Journal of Politics 39 (3): 563–595.Google Scholar
  75. Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. “Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities.” Comparative Political Studies 33 (6/7): 845–879.Google Scholar
  76. Kitschelt, Herbert, Kirk A. Hawkins, Juan Pablo Luna, Guillermo Rosas, and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2010. Latin American Party Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  77. Koger, Gregory. 2003. “Position Taking and Cosponsorship in the US House.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 28 (2): 225–246.Google Scholar
  78. Kraemer, Moritz. 1997. “Intergovernmental Transfers and Political Representation: Empirical Evidence from Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.” Working Paper 345, Inter-American Development Bank.Google Scholar
  79. Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.Google Scholar
  80. Langston, Joy. 2010. “Governors and ‘Their’ Deputies: New Legislative Principals in Mexico.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 35 (2): 235–258.Google Scholar
  81. Larocca, Roger T. 2006. The Presidential Agenda: Sources of Executive Influence in Congress. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press.Google Scholar
  82. Lee, Frances E. 2009. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  83. Lee, Frances E., and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. 1999. Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  84. Lehoucq, Fabrice, Gabriel Negretto, Francisco Aparicio, Benito Nacif, and Allyson Benton. 2008. “Policymaking in Mexico Under One-Party Hegemony and Divided Government.” In Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shape Policies, edited by Ernesto Stein, Mariano Tommasi, Pablo T. Spiller, and Carlos Scartascini, 287–328. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  85. Leiras, Marcelo. 2007. Todos los Caballos del Rey: La Integración de los Partidos Políticos y el Gobierno Democrático de la Argentina, 1995–2003. Buenos Aires: Prometeo.Google Scholar
  86. Levitsky, Steven. 2003. Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  87. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Martin Paldam. 2000. “Economic Voting: An Introduction.” Electoral Studies 19 (2/3): 113–121.Google Scholar
  88. Lijphart, Arend. 2012. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  89. Llanos, Mariana. 2002. Privatization and Democracy in Argentina: An Analysis of President-Congress Relations. New York: Palgrave.Google Scholar
  90. Llanos, Mariana, and Detlef Nolte. 2003. “Bicameralism in the Americas: Around the Extremes of Symmetry and Incongruence.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 9 (3): 54–86.Google Scholar
  91. Llanos, Mariana, and Francisco Sánchez. 2006. “Council of Elders? The Senate and Its Members in the Southern Cone.” Latin American Research Review 41 (1): 133–152.Google Scholar
  92. Lodola, Germán. 2010. The Politics of Subnational Coalition Building: Gubernatorial Redistributive Strategies in Argentina and Brazil. PhD Dissertation Submitted to the University of Pittsburgh.Google Scholar
  93. Lucardi, Adrián, and Juan Pablo Micozzi. 2016. “The Effect of the Electoral Calendar on Politicians’ Selection into Legislative Cohorts and Legislative Behavior in Argentina, 1983–2007.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 41 (4): 811–840.Google Scholar
  94. Mainwaring, Scott. 1999. Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. Stanford: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
  95. Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1997. “Conclusion: Presidentialism and the Party System.” In Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Mathew Soberg Shugart, 394–439. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  96. Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes. 1999. “Elections and Representation.” In Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, 29–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  97. Marshall, Bryan W., and Brandon C. Prins. 2007. “Strategic Position Taking and Presidential Influence in Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 32 (2): 257–284.Google Scholar
  98. Martin, Andrew D. 2001. “Congressional Decision Making and the Separation of Powers.” The American Political Science Review 95 (2): 361–378.Google Scholar
  99. Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Heaven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  100. Micozzi, Juan Pablo. 2012. “Does Electoral Accountability Make a Difference? Direct Elections, Career Ambition, and Legislative Performance in the Argentine Senate.” The Journal of Politics 75 (1): 137–149.Google Scholar
  101. ———. 2014a. “From House to Home: Strategic Bill Drafting in Multilevel Systems with Non-static Ambition.” The Journal of Legislative Studies 20 (3): 265–284.Google Scholar
  102. ———. 2014b. “Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House.” Comparative Political Studies 47 (8): 1186–1208.Google Scholar
  103. Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. “Constituency Influence in Congress.” The American Political Science Review 57 (1): 45–56.Google Scholar
  104. Mitchel, Paul. 2000. “Voters and Their Representatives: Electoral Institutions and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 37 (3): 335–351.Google Scholar
  105. Morgenstern, Scott. 2004. Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  106. Morgenstern, Scott, and Peter M. Siavelis. 2008. “Pathways to Power and Democracy in Latin America.” In Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, edited by Peter M. Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern, 371–402. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
  107. Mueller, Keith J. 1985. “Explaining Variation and Change in Gubernatorial Powers, 1960–1982.” The Western Political Quarterly 38 (3): 424–431.Google Scholar
  108. Müller, Wolfgang C. 2000. “Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work.” European Journal of Political Research 37 (3): 309–333.Google Scholar
  109. Pearson, Kathryn. 2008. “Party Loyalty and Discipline in the Individualistic Senate.” In Why Not Parties? Party Effects in the United States Senate, edited by Nathan W. Monroe, Jason M. Roberts, and David W. Rohde, 100–120. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  110. Pennings, Paul, and Reuven Y. Hazan. 2001. “Democratizing Candidate Selection: Causes and Consequences.” Party Politics 7 (3): 267–275.Google Scholar
  111. Peterson, Paul E., and Jay P. Greene. 1994. “Why Executive-Legislative Conflict in the United States is Dwindling.” British Journal of Political Science 24 (1): 33–55.Google Scholar
  112. Pezzola, Anthony. 2017. “Cooperación diacrónica para intereses diversos: Intereses y lealtades provinciales en la formulación de políticas en Argentina.” Política y gobierno 24 (1): 125–156.Google Scholar
  113. Riker, William H. 1975. “Federalism.” In Handbook of Political Science, Volume 5: Governmental Institutions and Processes, edited by Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, 93–172. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.Google Scholar
  114. Rocca, Michael S., and Stacy B. Gordon. 2010. “The Position-Taking Value of Bill Sponsorship in Congress.” Political Research Quarterly 63 (2): 387–397.Google Scholar
  115. Rodríguez, Jesús, and Alejandro Bonvecchi. 2004. “El Papel del Poder Legislativo en el Proceso Presupuestario: La Experiencia Argentina.” Serie macroeconomía del desarrollo 32, CEPAL, Santiago de Chile.Google Scholar
  116. Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  117. Rosas, Guillermo, and Joy Langston. 2011. “Gubernatorial Effects on the Voting Behavior of National Legislators.” The Journal of Politics 73 (2): 477–493.Google Scholar
  118. Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2009. “Political Prowess or ‘Lady Luck’? Evaluating Chief Executives’ Legislative Success Rates.” The Journal of Politics 71 (4): 1342–1356.Google Scholar
  119. ———. 2011. Ruling by Statute: How Uncertainty and Vote Buying Shape Lawmaking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  120. Saiegh, Sebastian M., and Mariano Tommasi. 1999. “Why Is Argentina’s Fiscal Federalism So Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth.” Journal of Applied Economics 2 (1): 169–209.Google Scholar
  121. Samuels, David. 1999. “Incentives to Cultivate a Party Vote in Candidate-Centric Electoral Systems: Evidence from Brazil.” Comparative Political Studies 32 (4): 487–518.Google Scholar
  122. ———. 2003. Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  123. ———. 2008. “Political Ambition, Candidate Recruitment, and Legislative Politics in Brazil.” In Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, edited by Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern, 76–91. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
  124. Samuels, David J., and Scott Mainwaring. 2004. “Strong Federalism, Constraints on the Central Government, and Economic Reform in Brazil.” In Federalism and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Edward L. Gibson, 85–130. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
  125. Santiso, Carlos. 2004. “Legislatures and Budget Oversight in Latin America: Strengthening Public Finance Accountability in Emerging Economies.” OECD Journal on Budgeting 4 (2): 47–76.Google Scholar
  126. Scartascini, Carlos. 2008. “Who’s Who in the PMP: An Overview of Actors, Incentives, and the Roles They Play.” In Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shape Policies, edited by Ernesto Stein, Mariano Tommasi, Pablo T. Spiller, and Carlos Scartascini, 29–68. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  127. Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1965. “The Politics of the Executive.” In Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, edited by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, 207–237. Boston: Little Brown.Google Scholar
  128. Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1978. The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  129. Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power.” American Political Science Review 81 (1): 85–104.Google Scholar
  130. Shikano, Susumu. 2008. “The Dimensionality of German Federal States’ Policy Preferences in the Bundesrat.” German Politics 17 (3): 340–352.Google Scholar
  131. Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  132. Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and Stephan Haggard. 2001. “Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems.” In Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, 64–102. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  133. Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and Scott Mainwaring. 1997. “Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate.” In Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, edited by Scott Mainwaring and Mathew Soberg Shugart, 12–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  134. Siavelis, Peter M., and Scott Morgenstern. 2008. “Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America: A Framework for Analysis.” In Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, edited by Peter M. Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern, 3–38. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.Google Scholar
  135. Spiller, Pablo T., and Mariano Tommasi. 2007. The Institutional Foundation of Public Policy in Argentina. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  136. Spiller, Pablo T., Mariano Tommasi, Mark P. Jones, and Sebastián Saiegh. 2007. “Congress, Political Careers, and the Provincial Connection.” In The Institutional Foundation of Public Policy in Argentina, edited by Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi, 53–88. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  137. Stokes, Susan C. 2005. “Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina.” American Political Science Review 99 (3): 315–325.Google Scholar
  138. Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  139. Swenden, Wilfried. 2004. Federalism and Second Chambers: Regional Representation in Parliamentary Federations: The Australian Senate and German Bundesrat Compared. Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang.Google Scholar
  140. Szwarcberg, Mariela L. 2015. Mobilizing Poor Voters: Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  141. Tavits, Margit. 2009. “The Making of Mavericks: Local Loyalities and Party Defection.” Comparative Political Studies 42 (6): 793–815.Google Scholar
  142. Tsebelis, George, and Jeannette Money. 1997. Bicameralism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  143. Victor, Jennifer Nicoll. 2011. “Legislating Versus Campaigning: The Legislative Behavior of Higher Office-Seekers.” American Politics Research 39 (1): 3–31.Google Scholar
  144. Weaver, R. Kent. 1986. “The Politics of Blame Avoidance.” Journal of Public Policy 6 (4): 371–398.Google Scholar
  145. Wehner, Joachim. 2006. “Assessing the Power of Purse: An Index of Legislative Budget Institutions.” Political Studies 54 (4): 767–785.Google Scholar
  146. Weingast, Barry R., and William Marshall. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 96 (1): 132–163.Google Scholar
  147. Weldon, Jeffrey. 2002. “Legislative Delegation and the Budget Process in Mexico.” In Legislative Politics in Latin America, edited by Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, 377–410. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  148. Wildavsky, Aaron. 1966. “The Two Presidencies: Presidential Power Is Greatest When Directing Military and Foreign Policy.” Trans-Action 4 (2): 7–14.Google Scholar
  149. Zimmerman, Joseph F. 1992. Contemporary American Federalism: The Growth of National Power. Leicester: Leicester University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Developing EconomiesJapan External Trade OrganizationChibaJapan

Personalised recommendations