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Introduction

  • Hirokazu Kikuchi
Chapter
Part of the IDE-JETRO Series book series (IDE)

Abstract

This introductory chapter explains why it is important to rethink gubernatorial effects on a national political arena. The 2001 political-economic crisis in Argentina and President Lula’s difficulty in reforming the Brazilian tax system indicate that governors may exercise considerable influence over national politics, but we still do not know why. Kikuchi argues that we should study senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor together, considering senators from the same district may face pressures from different actors of subnational politics. He also introduces the case of Argentina for this study.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Developing EconomiesJapan External Trade OrganizationChibaJapan

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