Game Theory and John Forbes Nash in the History of Economic Thought

  • Güner Koç Aytekin
Conference paper
Part of the Springer Proceedings in Complexity book series (SPCOM)


In our globalizing world, progress and innovations are recorded on behalf of the knowledge every day. In this context, very important studies have been made, and significant progress has been achieved after John von Neumann who was a genius mathematician first proposed the idea of explaining the human behavior by means of games. Game theory, having wide application range of scientific areas, has found wide application areas such as business, economics, international relations, military areas, politics, education, administration, law, and many others. Game theory has raging application possibilities in many areas; especially in the field of economic sciences and it has gone through a long development process until the present day. Therefore, in this study, the journey of the development process of game theory has been studied. In this process, important developments have taken place in the direction of the applicability of the social sciences into game theory which is focusing to take the right decisions to find the right strategies. John Forbes Nash is a major contributor to the studies in this direction among other scientists. Therefore, in this study, it has tried to put forward the critical role of John F. Nash in this process.


Game theory Nash equilibrium Economics International trade Strategy Rational thinking Decision-making 


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© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Güner Koç Aytekin
    • 1
  1. 1.Ufuk UniversityAnkaraTurkey

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