Peace, R2P and Public Goods Theory

  • Bjørn MøllerEmail author


The “Public Goods Theory”, also known as the “Collective Action Theory”, stems from the field of economics; however, it is now widely applied to other strands of life at all levels of aggregation—from the individual to the international. In the present chapter, the author applies this theory to issues of peace and war, with a special focus on “strangers”, who are in need of urgent assistance because of an armed conflict. The author neither claims that the public goods theory can explain everything in the field of peace and conflict studies nor that its predictions are always correct, but merely argues that it may provide an explanation of collective action failures.


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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Aalborg UniversityAalborgDenmark

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