The Growing Block

  • Fabrice Correia
  • Sven Rosenkranz
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 395)


In this chapter we reconstruct the original version of the Growing Block Theory of time first advanced by C. D. Broad, highlight its shortcomings, and propose an improved version of the theory. We show that this improved version of the theory is superior to two more recent attempts to capture the idea of the growing block. In Sect. 4.1 we critically review central passages from Broad’s Scientific Thought, identify core principles that give substance to the image of a growing block, delimited by an edge of becoming beyond which nothing exists, and diagnose a number of problems with Broad’s account. In Sect. 4.2 we then present a neater version of the theory that still incorporates central ideas of Broad’s, yet avoids those problems. In Sect 4.3 we critically review the accounts respectively advanced by M. Tooley and T. Button and conclude that our version of the theory fares much better.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fabrice Correia
    • 1
  • Sven Rosenkranz
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Département de PhilosophieUniversité de GenèveGenèveSwitzerland
  2. 2.ICREABarcelonaSpain
  3. 3.Departament de FilosofiaUniversitat de BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain

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