Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Entities in a Multi-ethnic State? Instability and Disputed Interpretations of the State

Chapter
Part of the Federalism and Internal Conflicts book series (FEINCO)

Abstract

This chapter outlines how the collapse of Yugoslavia led to the outbreak of a vicious war in Bosnian Herzegovina and how the 1995 Dayton peace agreement attempted to end the violence by establishing a strongly decentralised federation with two entities, the Federation and the Republika Srpska. It finds that the agreement provided for two competing understanding of the nature of the state and this inhibited the effectiveness of domestic guarantees. Furthermore, it argues that despite the international community’s initial success in preventing the re-emergence of violence in the longer-term legitimacy concerns, the focus on other international crises and growing international divisions has limited effectiveness of international guarantees.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Law and GovernmentDublin City UniversityDublinIreland

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