Rethinking US Security Commitment to Taiwan

  • Yuan-kang Wang
Part of the Politics and Development of Contemporary China book series (PDCC)


Should the United States end its security commitment to Taiwan to avoid war with an increasingly powerful China? This chapter argues that accommodating China on Taiwan will increase—not decrease—the probability of conflict in East Asia. Drawing on IR theory, I analyze the five errors of accommodationist proposals—underestimation of structural pressures, mistaken assumption of China’s limited aims, damage to US alliance credibility, downplaying of Taiwan’s democratic and strategic values, and destruction of the delicate balance between deterrence and reassurance. Contrary to accommodationist arguments, ending US security commitment to Taiwan will not make Asia more peaceful but rather more dangerous. For US grand strategy toward Asia, Taiwan is an asset, not a liability.


Accommodation Deterrence Alliance Realism Credibility 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yuan-kang Wang
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceWestern Michigan UniversityKalamazooUSA

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