Designing Medical Facilities to Care for Patients with Highly Hazardous Communicable Diseases
Certain highly hazardous communicable diseases (HHCD), including viral hemorrhagic fevers, the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and severe acute respiratory syndrome virus (SARS), have caused nosocomial outbreaks in unprepared facilities. Consequently, biocontainment units have been constructed to protect caregivers, patients, and family members, in addition to providing optimal care of the infected patient. Biocontainment units have adopted many of the design features originally found in biocontainment laboratories and can serve as national referral facilities for the most severe and highly hazardous infections.
Although a patient with a HHCD can show up at any healthcare facility unannounced, not every hospital can or should attempt to establish a biocontainment unit. Nevertheless, there are design features or management principles found in biocontainment units that can be adopted in most facilities. Awareness of the potential risk, in addition to adopting structural and policy control measures, can do a lot to prepare a facility for the next unexpected infectious disease outbreak.
KeywordsHigh-level containment care Highly hazardous communicable diseases Biocontainment Viral hemorrhagic fevers Biosafety level SARS MERS Ebola Marburg Lassa
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