Advertisement

Why Cooperation Between Agencies is (Sometimes) Possible: Turf Protection as Enabler of Regulatory Cooperation in the European Union

  • Eva Heims
Chapter
Part of the Executive Politics and Governance book series (EXPOLGOV)

Abstract

The literature on bureaucratic cooperation is replete with examples of deficiency and failure, while conventional wisdom holds that cooperation is bound to fail because bureaucratic organizations jealously guard their turf. Heims questions the notion that turf protection dynamics are bound to result in non-cooperation and, by drawing on examples of regulatory cooperation in the European Union, shows that turf protection dynamics can enable, as well as obstruct, cooperation. On this basis, the chapter develops a typology of the politics of (non-)cooperation by outlining four different cooperation dynamics and associated cooperation outcomes. This matrix portrays cooperation outcomes as a function of the overlap of organizations’ resources and core missions, describing how turf protection dynamics can enable cooperation and coordination when missions overlap and resources are complementary.

Keywords

Regulatory cooperation Turf protection Resource complementarity EU agencies 

References

  1. 6, P. (2004). Joined-up government in the western world in comparative perspective: A preliminary literature review. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 14(1), 103–138.Google Scholar
  2. Alexander, E. R. (1995). How organizations act together: Interorganizational coordination in theory and practice. Luxembourg: Gordon and Breach.Google Scholar
  3. Bach, T., De Francesco, F., Maggetti, M., & Ruffing, E. (2016). Transnational bureaucratic politics: An institutional rivalry perspective on EU network governance. Public Administration, 94(1), 9–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bardach, E. (1996). Turf barriers to inter-agency collaboration. In D. F. Kettl & H. B. Milward (Eds.), The state of public management (pp. 168–192). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Bardach, E. (1998). Getting agencies to work together: The practice and theory of managerial craftsmanship. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.Google Scholar
  6. Busuioc, E. M. (2016). Friend or foe? Inter-agency cooperation, organizational reputation, and turf. Public Administration, 94(1), 40–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Busuioc, E. M., & Lodge, M. (2016). The reputational basis of public accountability. Governance, 29(2), 247–263.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Carpenter, D. P. (2001). The forging of bureaucratic autonomy: Reputations, networks, and policy innovation in executive agencies, 1862–1928. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Carpenter, D. P. (2010). Reputation and power: Organizational image and pharmaceutical regulation at the FDA. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  10. Dehousse, R. (1997). Regulation by networks in the European Community: The role of European agencies. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(2), 246–261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Dunleavy, P. (1991). Democracy, bureaucracy and public choice: Economic explanations in political science. London: Pearson Education.Google Scholar
  12. Eberlein, B., & Grande, E. (2005). Beyond delegation: Transnational regulatory regimes and the EU regulatory state. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(1), 89–112.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Etienne, J. (2015). The politics of detection in business regulation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(1), 257–284.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Gilad, S., Maor, M., & Ben-Nun Bloom, P. (2015). Organizational reputation, the content of public allegations, and regulatory communication. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(2), 451–478.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Heidbreder, E. G. (2014). Administrative capacities in the EU: Consequences of multi-level policy-making. In M. Lodge & K. Wegrich (Eds.), The problem-solving capacity of the modern state: Governance challenges and administrative capacities (pp. 218–237). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  16. Heims, E. M. (2014). Managing European risks without a European state: Transnational coordination between regulators in the European Union. Doctoral thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, London.Google Scholar
  17. Heims, E. M. (2016). Explaining coordination between national regulators in EU agencies: The role of formal and informal organization. Public Administration, 94(4), 881–896.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Heims, E. M. (2017). Regulatory coordination in the EU: A cross-sector comparison. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(8), 1116–1134.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Hood, C. (1976). The limits of administration. London: Wiley.Google Scholar
  20. Lerner, A. W. (1986). There is more than one way to be redundant: A comparison of alternatives for the design and use of redundancy in organizations. Administration and Society, 18(3), 334–359.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Majone, G. (2000). The credibility crisis of community regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2), 273–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Maor, M. (2010). Organizational reputation and jurisdictional claims: The case of the US Food and Drug Administration. Governance, 23(1), 133–159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Maor, M., Gilad, S., & Ben-Nun Bloom, P. (2013). Organizational reputation, regulatory talk and strategic silence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23(3), 581–603.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority. (2011). Response of the Competent Authorities of the Netherlands to the recommendations of Report ref. DG(SANCO)/2011-6019-MR of an audit carried out from 12 to 23 September 2011. European Commission Health and Consumers Directorate-General, Directorate F—Food and Veterinary Office. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/act_getPDFannx.cfm?ANX_ID=6562
  25. Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority. (2013). Response of the Competent Authorities of the Netherlands to the recommendations of Report ref. DG(SANCO)/2012-6312-MR of an audit carried out from 19 to 23 November 2012. European Commission Health and Consumers Directorate-General, Directorate F—Food and Veterinary Office. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/act_getPDFannx.cfm?ANX_ID=7214
  26. Niskanen, W. A. (1994 [1971]). Bureaucracy and public economics. Brookfield: Elgar Publishing.Google Scholar
  27. Oliver, C. (1990). Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Integration and future directions. The Academy of Management Review, 15(2), 241–265.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Peters, B. G. (2015). Pursuing horizontal management: The politics of public sector coordination. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.Google Scholar
  29. Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing returns, path dependence and the study of politics. American Political Science Review, 94(2), 251–267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Sabel, C. F., & Zeitlin, J. (2010). Experimentalist governance in the European Union: Towards a new architecture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in administration: A sociological interpretation. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
  32. Trondal, J. (2010). An emergent European executive order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Wilson, J. ([1989] 2000). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PoliticsUniversity of YorkYorkUK

Personalised recommendations