Accounting for Blind Spots

  • Martin LodgeEmail author
Part of the Executive Politics and Governance book series (EXPOLGOV)


Public and private organizations are regularly criticized for being blindsided. Lodge explores what explains the existence of blind spots, and how blind spots differ from other kinds of phenomena that have been associated with unintended consequences. By defining the blind spot as ‘not seeing the not seeing’, the chapter highlights the centrality of the blind spot to organizational life. The chapter develops its argument by first distinguishing the blind spot from other types of unintended consequences, pointing to varieties of ways in which blind spots emerge, before discussing recipes to mitigate the effects of blind spots. Lodge argues that blind spots are intrinsic in any form of organizing and that therefore all organizational life is inherently shaped by blind spots.


Blind spot Unintended consequences Limits of administration’ Executive government 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Political ScienceLondonUK

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